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No. 20060364-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W. TUTTLE, KENTON TUTTLE and
LORIM. TUTTLE,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
JERRY D. OLDS, Utah State Engineer, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, and TERRY MONROE,
Defendants/Appellees,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Defendants-Appellees Jerry D. Olds, Utah Department of Natural
Resources, and Terry Monroe submit this brief in answer to the brief of
Appellants William J. Tuttle, Charlene W. Tuttle, Kenton Tuttle and
Lori M. Tuttle.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Untimely notice of claim
The Tuttles sold their farms at an inflated value allegedly because the
defendants negligently failed to discover during a groundwater survey that
the Tuttles were illegally irrigating their farms. Did the one year period for
filing notice of their negligence claim begin to run when the Tuttles first
became aware that the survey was wrong, or later, when they were held
liable to the sellers for fraud?
A. Standard of review
Failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Cedar Prof I Plaza, L.C. v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App. 36, f 7,131 P.3d
275, 278. Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a
question of law that this Court reviews under a correction of error standard
without deference to the trial court. See, e.g., Case v. Case, 2004 UT App.
423,1 5,103 P.3d 171.
B. Preservation of issue
The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that may
be raised at any time. State v. Sun Surety Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, f 7, 99 P.3d
818, 820. Nevertheless, the defendants did raise this issue in their motion to
-2-

dismiss, R.60-62, and the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on
this issue. See Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A.1

2. Waiver of procedural error
In their opening brief, the Tuttles failed to specify or provide any analysis
concerning the "many matters" outside the pleadings that they claim the trial
court improperly relied upon, or the allegations they contend the trial court
failed to construe in their favor. Have the Tuttles waived these claims of
procedural error?
A Standard of review
This issue is unique to the appeal and is properly raised for the first time
in this brief.
B. Preservation of issue
This issue is unique to the appeal and is properly raised for the first time
in this brief.

\A copy of the Order is included in the addendum to this brief because
the Tuttles failed to attach one as required by Rule 24(a)(ll)(c) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
-3-

3. No duty
The state engineer conducted a groundwater survey of the Pahvant Valley
to address a concern about significant overdraft of water, some of which was
caused by the irrigation of farmland not covered by valid water rights. In
conducting the survey, did the engineer owe a duty to the Turtles to exercise
reasonable care to discover their illegal watering?
A Standard of review
Whether a duty exists is a question of law. See, e.g., Webb v. University of
Utah, 2005 UT 80,1 9,125 P.3d 906, 909; Weber v. SpHngville City, 725 P.2d
1360,1363 (Utah 1986). When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b) or
12(c), this Court should accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true
and interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Russell Packard
Dev., Inc. v. Varson,2005 UT 14, f 3,108 P.3d 741, 743; Miller v.
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App. 80, f 6,110 P.3d 144,146.
B. Preservation of issue
This issue was raised at the hearing on the defendants' Rule 12(bX6)
motion to dismiss. R. 208 at 16-17,19-21, 55-60. The trial court granted
judgment on the pleadings on this issue. See Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A.
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4. No estoppel
Following steps to prevent farmers in the Pahvant Valley from irrigating
without valid water rights, the Division of Water Rights sent farmers a letter
expressing the state engineer's opinion that all irrigated land was now
covered by a valid water right. Later, the Division discovered that additional
farmland was being irrigated without a water right, exposing the fact that
the Tuttles had recently sold their farms at an inflated price based on their
representations to the sellers that the water rights were sufficient to irrigate
the entire farmland. May the Tuttles assert a claim for equitable estoppel
against the Division?
A Standard of review
The dismissal of a claim for equitable estoppel should be reviewed for
correctness, without deference to the decision below. See Holland v. CSRB,
856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah 1993); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 768-69 (1991).
When reviewing the propriety of dismissal under Rule 12(b) or 12(c), this
Court should accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and
interpret those facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Russell Packard
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 3,108 P.3d 741, 743; Miller v.
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App. 80, \ 6,110 P.3d 144,146.

-5-

B. Preservation of issue
This issue was raised in the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 180-81. The
trial court granted the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, without
specifically addressing the estoppel claim. See Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A.

5. No takings violation
Following steps to prevent farmers in the Pahvant Valley from irrigating
without valid water rights, the Division of Water Rights sent farmers a letter
expressing the state engineer's opinion that all irrigated land was now
covered by a valid water right. Later, the Division discovered that additional
farmland was being irrigated without a water right. Did the Division's action
to prevent continued illegal irrigation of the farmland constitute a violation
of the Utah takings clause?
A. Standard of review
The interpretation and application of the Utah takings clause present
questions of law, which should be reviewed for correctness. See View Condo.
Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2005 UT 91, M 29-30,127 P.3d 697, 704-05;
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah
1996).
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B. Preservation of issue
This issue was raised in the defendants' motion to dismiss. R.68-69. The
trial court granted the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings, without
specifically addressing the takings claim. See Order Granting Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following provisions are central to the issues on appeal and are
included in Addendum B to this Brief.
Rule 10(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-1 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-15 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-17 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-9 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (West 2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-l(a) (West 2004)

-7-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

This action arose from the Tuttles' sale of farmland in Millard County,
Utah, to Arizona residents Grant and Fern Ellsworth. After the sale, the
Ellsworths learned that, contrary to the Tuttles' representations, the water
rights appurtenant to the farms were insufficient to water a substantial part
of the farm acreage. The Ellsworths sued the Tuttles in federal court and won
a judgment against them for about $ 1.4 million based on fraud, breach of
warranty, wrongful conversion, breach of contract, punitive damages,
attorney fees and costs.
The Tuttles then brought this action against the state engineer, 2 alleging
that when he conducted a groundwater survey in the mid-1990s, he
negligently failed to discover that they were illegally irrigating a substantial
portion of their farms. About a year before the Tuttles sold their farms, the
Division of Water Rights 3 informed them that it could not identify any water
right for a large irrigation well on one of the farms. Nevertheless, the Tuttles
allege that they relied on the groundwater survey when they sold the farms
2

State Engineer Olds is sued in his official capacity only because the
events on which the Tuttles base their claims occurred before Olds took the
position.
3

The Division of Water Rights is part of the Department of Natural
Resources.
-8-

to the Ellsworths. The Tuttles further claim that when the Division refused
to allow the Ellsworths to continue to irrigate land not covered by a valid
water certificate, it took the Tuttles* property without due process of law. The
Tuttles assert claims in negligence, estoppel, and violation of the takings
clause of the Utah Constitution.
The trial court dismissed the Tuttles' claims on two grounds: first, the
court held that, as the landowners, the Tuttles were charged with knowing
the water rights appurtenant to their land and that the state engineer owed
no duty to the Tuttles to use reasonable care to discover their illegal
watering. Second, the trial court held that the Tuttles' claims were barred
because they had failed to file a timely notice of claim as required by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Defendants urge this Court to affirm the
decision below.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On July 28, 2005, the Tuttles commenced this action by filing their
Complaint. R. 1-33. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an
answer. R. 48-50. The motion was fully briefed, R. 51-125,131-74, & 175-83,
and the parties presented oral argument. R. 193, 208. At the hearing, the
trial court granted the motion under Rule 12(c), as a judgment on the

-9-

pleadings. On March 31, 2006, the trial court entered an Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. R. 194-96; Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Complaint and,
pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, from record facts
established by documents that were either attached to the Complaint or that
are central to the allegations.
In 1994, in response to evidence of a significant overdraft of water in the
Pahvant Valley in Millard County, Utah, the Utah Division of Water Rights
proposed a groundwater management plan for the area. R.20-24. The
Division estimated the annual recharge to the groundwater system to be
65,000 acre-feet, while the annual discharge was 100,000 acre-feet—a loss of
35,000 acre-feet each year. Id. at 20. About 80 per cent of the discharge was
from irrigation wells and, of 36,000 total acres of farmland, about 8,800 were
being irrigated without a valid or properly recorded water right. Id. The
proposed plan stated, "this issue is very serious and will be addressed first to
see if, by eliminating the illegal acreage, the well withdrawals can be
reduced." Id. Therefore, "the initial phase [of the plan] deals with elimination
of any irrigated acreage which does not have a water right and controlling

-10-

wasting wells." R.2L
To implement the plan, the Division surveyed the irrigated acreage of the
Pahvant Valley, where the Tuttles owned two farms.

if

WO.4 Aware that

some of their neighbors had received warning letters regarding illegal
irrigation, the Tuttles "became anxious about whether their water usage
would be deemed impropei

the Division's

regional office in Richfield, Utah and inquired whether they were in violation.
Unidentified employees of the regional office told the Tuttles that if they had
not

cause for concern." Id. at f H56-

59. The employees also showed the Tuttles a map of the Pahvant Valley with
the areas of suspected violations shaded red. The Tuttles' farms were
shaded red. R.9-10 at 1160-62.
In March 1996, then state engineer Robert Morgan sent a letter to water
users in Pahvant Valley, including the Tuttles
of the groundwater management plan. Among other things, Morgan reported
that a[d]uring the spring of 1994, the acreage survey was completed and all
water mmn: ,|i|»11

"<

igatiiij,1' ' " 'I without a water right were notified. As.'

a result of this effort and with the cooperation of water users, all irrigated
lands are now covered by valid water rights." R.25; Appellants
4

,

William and Charlotte Tuttle owned a farm consisting of over 1,000
acres. R. 2 at f 8. Their son Kenton and his wife Lori owned a smaller farm of
about 640 acres. R. 2 at f 9. Both farms included substantial acreage not
covered by a certificate of beneficial use. R. 134 at I f 17-18.
-11-

Addendum A.
During this time, the Tuttles had been irrigating their entire farmland of
about 1,700 acres, but held valid water rights for only 935.2 acres. R.12 at
H89; R. 13 at ff 98-99; R.134 at M18-19. 5 The groundwater survey, however,
did not discover the shortage and therefore the Tuttles did not receive
notification of their illegal irrigation. R.9 at f 51. In 1998, however, Assistant
Regional Engineer Terry L. Monroe sent a letter to William J. Tuttle
notifying him that Monroe had been unable to identify any water right
associated with a "large irrigation well" equipped with a diesel motor ("the
Diesel Well") located on Turtle's farm and requesting assistance in locating a
water right for the well. R.27.
The Tuttles received Monroe's letter while they were in negotiations to
sell their farms, including their water rights, to the Ellsworths. R.10 at 170
& R.27. When the Ellsworths inquired about water rights, the Tuttles gave
them documentation of their water rights and the 1996 letter from Morgan.
Id. at M68-69. The sale of the farm and water rights closed on July 1,1999.
R.11 at M76-77.
Several months after the sale, Monroe sent the Ellsworths a letter about
5

At hearing below, the Tuttles refused to concede that a substantial
portion of their farms was not covered by water rights. R. 208 at 29-30. That
refusal contradicted their own allegations. R. 12 at f 89; R 13 at ff 98-99; R.
134 at ff 18-19. More importantly, a substantial shortage in water rights is a
necessary premise of their claim that the defendants negligently conducted
the survey.
-12-

concerns he had with water rights on the farms. R.11 at f 78 & R.28-30. In
the letter, Monroe stated that the Diesel Well was an improper point of
diversion and analyzed the various water rights associated with the farms,
concluding that rights existed for the sole supply of only 861.10 of 1700 acres.
R.28-30. Monroe informed the Ellsworths that ' 11 I I

1111 \M 11 • I,' 11 Il 11 m a t t h e s e

issues be resolved before the upcoming irrigation season as this ofifice will not
allow the continued use of a well with no water rights in it and the continued
irrigation of land
The Ellsworths filed suit against the Tuttles in November 2001. R.12 at
f 85. A jury verdict against the Tuttles was rendered on April 30, 2003, and a
judgmt

ately $ i

illion. Id. at f 92.6 The Tuttles

filed a notice of claim against State Engineer Jerry D. Olds and the
Department of Natural Resources on about April 28, 2004. R. 113-20.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

'liniiit 111 I

ii I DiTiril.s1 ilisimiswil the Tuttles'negligence claims against

the defendants because the Tuttles failed to file a notice of claim within a
year of when the claims arose as required by the Utah Governmental

•bThe judgment was afliini<nl DM .'ippts'il i Ellsworth i ",.i,}ui ,i"". .", 148 Fed.
Appx. 653 (10th Cir. 2005).
-13-

Immunity Act. At the latest, the claims arose in November 2001, when the
Ellsworths filed suit against the Tuttles in federal court. The Tuttles' notice
of claim was not filed until April 2004.
The Tuttles have waived on appeal any error resulting from the trial
courts' alleged reliance on materials outside the pleadings by failing to
explain their argument in their opening brief with enough specificity to
enable defendants to respond. The only outside matters to which the Tuttles
refer is "the basis for the jury's decision in the federal action" and the
"decisions made in the federal courts." But the Tuttles themselves relied on
pleadings from the federal action in opposing the defendants' motion to
dismiss. Moreover, public records from the federal case were central to the
allegations and could have properly been considered under Rule 10(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, although both parties offered
outside materials and the trial court asked questions about the federal case,
the court did not rely on and therefore implicitly excluded outside materials
in making its decision.
Even if the Tuttles had timely filed notice of their negligence claims, those
claims were also correctly dismissed because the state engineer owed the
Tuttles no duty to use reasonable care in conducting a groundwater survey
whose express purpose was to eliminate illegal irrigation, not to determine or
alter water rights. In addition, the Tuttles' allegations fail to establish

-14-

several necessary elements of an estoppel claim against a governmental
€

^y set of facts that could be proven in

support of their claim, demonstrate that defendants made a specific written
representation that the Tuttles had sufficient water rights to irrigate their
enure farm m ii'ii^1, MMI tln»y reasonably relied on the statements that were
made, that manifest injustice would result if estoppel were not applied and
that the application of estoppel would not impair the exercise of the
governmental function of administering water rights.
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed the Tuttles* taking claim
because the Tuttles

"ghts to

irrigate their entire farmland. Nor did the Division ever "take" property that
was never the Tuttles' to begin with. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
judgm*

ARGUMENT

1. The Notice of Claim Was Untimely
The trial court correctly held that the Tuttles* notice of claim was
untimely because it was filed more than one year after their claims accrued.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") provides that "a claim
against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises . . . "
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (West 2004).7 The Act further provides that "[a]
claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim
were against a private person begins to run." Id. at 63-30-11(1).8
Generally, "a statute of limitations is triggered upon the happening of the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Cedar Prof I Plaza v.
Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App. 36, f 11,131 P.3d 275, 279 (citation and

7

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was repealed as of July 1,
2004 and replaced by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. The
corresponding provision in the new act imposes the same time limitation as
the previous provision, but alters the place of filing. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30d-402 (West 2004) (effective July 1, 2004).
8

The corresponding provision in the new act sets forth a new exception
that codifies a discovery rule. See Section 63-30d-401(l)(a)-(c).
-16-

internal quotation marks omitted) (construing parallel notice requirement for
claims against political subdivisions). However, a plaintiff is "not entitled to
wait until it [knows]

**ting [the claim against the

defendant]. It is enough that [the plaintiff is] 'aware that the governmental
entity's action or inaction ha[s] resulted in some kind of harm to [the
plaintiffs] i 11 ti n . *1.. w I " I "1 1 1 "I i i 1 111, Bank One Utah v. West Jordan
City, 2002 UT App 271,112, 54 R3d 135).
The Tuttles were certainly aware that the allegedly negligent survey had
n • s 11 I il n i in i in , HI i mi in in i I i in in in in I I il i ni il Interests- by the lime the Ellsworths filed their
complaint against the Tuttles in federal court, in November 2001. In fact, the
Tuttles had reason to doubt the survey long before then.
c I t, landowners are presumed to know the extent of their water rights.
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1246 (Utah 1980), superseded by statute on
procedural grounds as note

1307 (U

In addition, the Tuttles' own allegations establish that they had doubts that
prompted them to inquire at the Division's regional office in Richfield. R.9 at
Iff

f

'*«"- " • I-** ! nidentified employees at the

regional office resolved those doubts, the Tuttles apparently ignored their
actual water certificates.
Moreover,

* 998 letter from Terry Monroe questioning the existence of a

water right for the Diesel Well should have revived the Tuttles' concerns
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before they sold their farms. The Tuttles had at least inquiry notice, if not
outright personal knowledge, that the survey was inaccurate even before the
sale of their farms. See, e.g., Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001UT 43,
M 26-27, 24 P.3d 984, 991-92 (holding shareholder of closely held corporation
was on inquiry notice of claim for conversion of shares when she was denied
access to company information); Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902
P.2d 1229,1231 (Utah 1995) (holding plaintiff was on inquiry notice of
property damage when they became aware of governmental investigation of
potential environmental contamination of neighboring property). Accordingly,
the trial court correctly concluded that the April 2004 notice of claim was
untimely.9
The Tuttles' attempt to challenge that conclusion by relying on Valley
Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Bldgs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997), is misplaced.
That^as^inv^v^^Iaiins^for slander of title and tortious inference by the
filing of a mechanic's lien against the plaintiffs property. The Supreme Coxirt
held that because special damages were a necessary element of those claims,
the claims did not accrue and the limitations period did not begin to run until

9

The Tuttles argued below that water rights are too complex for them
to understand without expert assistance. But this did not relieve them of the
obligation to exercise due diligence under the circumstances. See, e.g., Walker
Drug, 902 P.2d at 1229 (holding property owners were on inquiry notice of
possible environmental contamination of their property because they could
have hired an expert to investigate the cause of gas fumes in and around
their property).
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the property was sold and the damages became ascertainable. Id.
But proof of special damages is not a required element of the Tuttles'
negligence claim. Tlin IIHIII I Hi ii special ihiii.tf't's. rule applied in Valley Colour
is inapposite. Rather, the Tuttles sustained harm as soon as they became
aware that the survey was inaccurate because that is when they allegedly
sustained a dinu*

* their farms. That alleged diminution

occurred even regardless of whether they ever sold their property. Thus, there
is nothing about the federal damage award that was essential to the
C l.i,» I HI,! 1 ', I l l ( i l i S

I ill 1 1 ' II!.

. ' '

'

'

•

• •

•

•

'

• • • "

Again, the Tuttles were placed upon inquiry notice of the defendants'
alleged negligence no later than when the .

a

November 2001. But the Tuttles did not file their notice of claim for
approximately two and a half more years, in April 2004. Therefore, the trial
< * " i t correctly detei.

•

• foiled to file their notice of the ;

negligence claims within one year of when the claims arose. Accordingly, this
Court should affirm the dismissal of the Tuttles' negligence claims.10

10

The parties agree that no notice of claim was required for the Tuttles'
equitable estoppel and takings claims, which are discussed at Points 4 and 5
below.
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2. The Tuttles Have Waived Any Procedural Challenge to the
Decision Below by Failing to Adequately Develop Their
Argument in Their Opening Brief
The Tuttles have waived any procedural challenge to the decision below by
failing to adequately develop their argument in their opening brief. Rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the argument
"shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record relied on." U. R. App. P. 24(a)(9). In applying this rule, the
Supreme Court has declined to review issues not presented with sufficient
clarity, stating that "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a repository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." See
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, f 11, 974 P.2d 269, 271.
In this vein, both the Supreme Court and this Court have frequently
rejected arguments simply on the ground that they were insufficiently
developed in the appellant's opening brief. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005
UT 81, ff 133-34,130 P.3d 325, 349-50 (declining to review challenge to
denial of attorney fees and costs, when appellant argued only that "If the
court closely examines [the attorney's submissions below], it will see the
criteria for fees was met."); MiVida Enter, v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App. 400,
f 15 n.4,122 P.3d 144,148 (declining to review contentions that various
-20-

transactions were final step necessary to complete cause of action when
appellant "failed to detail the connection" between the transactions and the
claims).
The Tuttles' vague assertions that the trial court "considered many
matters which were outside the pleadings" and "did not construe the
' allegations in the light most favorab il i mi in

In ii.h .,' vv in h out further

analysis, is insufficient to raise an issue for appeal. See Appellants' Br. at 12.
Nor are the Tuttles' contentions that "the trial court considered . . . the basis
:

nd "relied in large part on

the decisions made in the federal courts," id., specific enough to satisfy the
Tuttles* burden of presenting the issue with sufficient clarity that the
dHWi(l/»niu in I HI i "(" mil would not have to guess exactly which decisions in
the federal action the Tuttles contend that the trial court erroneously relied
upon. This is especially true where, in opposition
Tuttles themselves alleged that the federal judgment was based on "fraud,
breach of warranty, wrongful conversion, breach of contract, and . . . punitive
damages based

153-54, and that "the jury

found in favor of the Ellsworths" after Terry Monroe testified that "the
[Tuttles'] water rights were sufficient to irrigate only 935.2 acres of the
ii|p|ij\)xirvi4ilj'li 1,700 fimiTes the Ellsworths had purchased from the Tuttles."
R.12 at 189-90 & R.134 at 1118-20.

-21-

Even if the Tuttles had not presented such allegations, records from the
federal case could have properly been considered under Rule 10(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "an exhibit to a pleading is a
part thereof for all purposes." U. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Under Rule 10(c), a
document that is central to the plaintiffs claims may be considered on a
motion to dismiss even if the plaintiff did not attach the document to the
complaint. See Oakwood Vill. LLC u. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, II10-15,
104 P.3d 1226,1230-32 (citing federal cases and discussing rule). In addition,
although at the hearing the trial court queried counsel about the federal case,
it implicitly excluded any outside materials in making its decision. See id. at
1231-32 (citing with approval Lybrook v. Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd.

ofEduc,

232 F.3d 1334,1342 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that trial court implicitly
excluded outside materials unless it could be established that the trial court
relied on those materials to reach Its decision, and stating *[T]he submission
of documents outside the pleadings by itself is not a basis for conversion to
summary judgment.")). Neither the written order dismissing the Tuttles'
claims, R. 194-96 (copy attached as Addendum A to this brief), nor the trial
court's oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing, R.208 at 60-65, referred to
any determinations made in the federal case. Rather, the trial court simply
held that the state engineer owed no duty to the Tuttles to conduct the
groundwater survey with reasonable care.
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Alth

the Tuttles cite case law on the standard of review for motions to

dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings, they fail to supply any
analysis or record citations to support their claim of procedural erroi
s

^ntext of this case, it is far from obvious that the trial

court improperly relied on any outside material in reaching its decision, or if it
did, how the trial court's ultimate decision was based MI Mini iiinl-ciiiil Thr
Tuttles 11 I r not wait until their reply brief to clarify their argument, leaving
defendants no opportunity to respond. Accordingly, this Court should reject
the Tuttles' claim of procedui.

r~

3. The State Engineer Owed No Duty to the Tuttles to Detect their
Illegal Irrigation
The trial court also correctly dismissed the Tuttles' negligence claims on
the alternative ground that the defendants owed no duty to the Tuttles to use
rtjiiisoiialilii1 vwv " in 11 ill ilmicting the groundwater survey so as to correctly •
determine their water rights. As the Tuttles correctly assert, under certain
circumstances not present in this case, the state engineer may seek t (i m ni m 11 mi luil

llf

Fhe Tuttles also claim that the Court's conversion of the matter to a
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) was error. Although defendants
believe that conversion was not necessary, they are unable to discern how the
conversion made any difference to the outcome. As the Tuttles note, the
standards for deciding Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions are the same.
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determination of water rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-l(a) (West 2004).
But, the state engineer has no statutory authority to adjudicate water rights.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 to -29 (West 2004); Searle v. Milburn Irrig. Co.,
2006 UT 16, f 34,133 P.3d 382, 391 ("It is well established that the state
engineer has no authority to finally adjudicate water rights."); Whitmore u.
Murray City, 107 Utah 445,154 P.2d 748, 750 (1944) ("The office of state
engineer was not created to adjudicate vested water rights between parties,
but to administer and supervise the appropriation of the waters of the state.").
Thus, only a court—not the state engineer—may finally determine water
rights.
Absent a court order, recorded certificates of beneficial use issued by the
state engineer at the conclusion of extensive administrative proceedings are
prima facie evidence of water rights. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-17 (West
2004) (The certificate so issued and filed shall be prima facie evidence of the
owner's right to the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the
place, and during the time specified therein, subject to prior rights); Lake
Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76,166 P. 309, 311 (1917)
("The certificate is [the water appropriator's] deed; his evidence of title, good,
at least against the state, for all it purports to be, and good as against every
one else who cannot show a superior right."). In the face of these formal
procedures for the determination and recognition of water rights, the Tuttles'
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claim that the state engineer owed them a duty of reasonable care to
determine their water rights in conducting a groundwater survey is
untenable.
Finding no statutory duty, the Tuttles make the unsupported assertion
that the state engineer nevertheless undertook to determine their water
rights in conducting the groundwater survey, and therefore had a duty to use
reasonable care in doing so. The fundamental flaw in this theory is the
absence of any alleged facts demonstrating that the state engineer undertook
such a determination. When imposing a duty to use reasonable care based
upon an undertaking to render services, courts "must narrowly construe the
scope of any assumed duty." See Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360,
1364-65 (Utah 1986) (declining to find that by maintaining creek's streambed
or shoreline to protect against flooding, city assumed a duty to prevent
children or adults from drowning in the stream). As expressly stated in the
proposed groundwater management plan, the state engineer undertook to
eliminate illegal watering so as to reduce or eliminate the overdraft of water
in the Pahvant Valley.
Furthermore, the engineer undertook the groundwater survey to protect
the public interest, not that of the Tuttles. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (West
2004) ("All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby
declared to the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use
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thereof."). Therefore, the allegation that the engineer missed the Tuttles'
illegal irrigation cannot be a basis for liability to the Tuttles absent the
existence of a special relationship, which the Tuttles do not allege and could
not demonstrate in this case. See Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, f 11
(recognizing and applying special duty rule, stating "[o]ur search for sound
public policy has led us . . . to decide that governmental actors should be
answerable in tort only when their negligent conduct causes injury to persons
who stand so far apart from the general public that we can describe them as
having a special relationship to the governmental actor.")
Neither of the cases cited by the Tuttles is to the contrary. In Nelson v.
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), there was no question that the
government had undertaken to fence the park adjacent to the river that the
child fell into. Id. at 570. Moreover, liability for voluntarily assumed duties is
generally limited to damages for physical harm. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 365 (1965); 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 105 (Westlaw updated May
2006). The case of DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) is
even further afield. There, liability was not based upon any undertaking by
the defendant alarm company to warn its customers that the alarm system
could be easily disabled by burglars. Rather, the Court held that a contractual
relationship between the parties created a special relationship that created a
duty of due care that extended beyond the obligations undertaken in the
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contract. Id. at 434-37. Moreover, DCR Inc. involved the duty of one private
entity to another, not the duty of a governmental entity to an individual. See
We&6,2005UT80,atflll.
The ultimate point of the Tuttles' contention that the state engineer had no
authority to conduct a groundwater survey is unclear, but in any event,
incorrect. The survey fell within the state engineer's responsibility "for the
general administrative supervision of the waters of the state and the
measurement, appropriation, apportionment, and distribution of those
waters," Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-l(3)(a) (West 2004); his authority to "secure
the equitable apportionment and distribution of the water according to the
respective rights of appropriators, id. at § 73-2-l(3)(b)(ii); his authority to sue
to "enjoin the unlawful appropriation, diversion, and use of surface and
underground water"12 and to "prevent waste, loss, or pollution of those
waters," id^at § 73-2-l(3)(b)(iii)(A) & (B); and his authority to require repairs
or construction to "prevent waste, loss, pollution or contamination of any
waters." Id. at § 73-5-9. In addition, the authority to conduct groundwater
surveys is presumed in authorizing the state engineer "for and on behalf of the
state of Utah, with the approval of the executive director of natural resources

12

See also Rocky Ford Irrig. Co. v. Rents Lake Reservoir Co., 140 P.2d
638, 639 (Utah 1943) (citing predecessor statute and stating, "It thus appears
that there are adequate procedures under which the state engineer can
compel the appropriator to comply with the law governing the diversion and
the use of water storage rights.").
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and the governor,... to enter into agreements with any federal or state
agency, subdivision or institution for cooperation in making snow surveys and
investigations of both underground and surface water resources of the state."
Id. at § 73-2-15. See also id. at § 73-2-17 ("The state engineer, for and on
behalf of the state of Utah, with the approval of the executive director and the
governor, is authorized and directed to enter into an agreement with the
United States geological survey or any other federal or state agency, for
cooperation in making investigations of the groundwater resources of the state
and reporting thereon.").
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the state engineer owed no duty to
the Tuttles to use reasonable care to conduct the groundwater survey of the
Pahvant Valley so as to discover the Tuttles' illegal watering. This Court
therefore should affirm the dismissal of the Tuttles* negligence claim.

4. The Tuttles' Allegations Do Not Satisfy the Heightened
Requirements for Estoppel Against the Government
The Tuttles' attempt to invoke equitable estoppel against the defendants
fails for several reasons: the Tuttles' allegations fail to show, first, that the
defendants made specific written representations that the Tuttles' water
rights "were sufficient to irrigate their farms"; second, that the Tuttles
reasonably relied upon the representations; third, that manifest injustice
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would result if estoppel were not applied; and fourth, that the exercise of
governmental powers would not be impaired if estoppel were applied.
This Court has recognized that "as a general rule, estoppel may not be
invoked against a governmental entity." View Condo. Owners Ass'n u. MSICO,
L.L.C., 2004 UT App. 104, f 34 n.2, 90 P.3d 1042,1051 n.2 (alterations and
quotation marks omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 2005 UT 91,127 P.3d 697.
But, "in Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for unusual
circumstances where it is plain that the interests of justice so require." Id.
(quotation and citation omitted). For the unusual circumstances exception to
apply, the plaintiff must show that "authorized government entities" have
made "very specific written representations." Id.
The Tuttles allege that oral representations were made to them by
unidentified employees of the Division's regional office in Richfield that if the
Tuttles had not received^motice that they were in violation and their land did
not appear on the color code maps, they had "no cause for concern." R.9 at f
59. These representations were nothing more than assurances that at that
time the Division did not consider the Tuttles to be illegally irrigating, not a
specific representation that they had valid water rights sufficient to enable
them to irrigate a certain acreage. But in any event, the representations were
oral and therefore cannot form the basis of an estoppel claim against
defendants. See, e.g., Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App. 93, f 8, 22
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P.3d 257, 259 (affirming dismissal of pedestrian's personal injury claim
against university, holding university not estopped from asserting that
pedestrian failed to comply with notice of claim requirement before filing
personal injury claim where alleged representation that notice should be sent
to Division of Risk Management was oral and plaintiff could not even identify
who made the representation).
The Tuttles also base their estoppel claim on the 1996 letter from the state
engineer to all water users in the Pahvant Valley, stating that "all irrigated
lands are now covered by a valid water right." R.25; Appellants' Br.,
Addendum A. This statement is a general statement about irrigation in the
Pahvant Valley and makes no representation specifically as to any particular
user's water rights. Therefore, it is also too general to support an estoppel
claim. Compare Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 53 (Utah 1988)
(holding public service commission not estopped from concluding that it had
no jurisdiction over one-way paging services and therefore refusing to issue
cease and desist order against unlicensed providers, even though it had
previously granted license to plaintiff to provide one-way paging services),
with View Condo. Owners Ass'n, 2004 UT App. 104, f 34, 90 P.3d 1042,1051
(remanding for further proceedings on estoppel claim to prevent construction
of single family homes on lots 5 and 9, where town had made specific
representations that "Lot 9" had been validly dedicated as "snow storage" for
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condominiums); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d
689, 691 (Utah 1979) (holding state liquor commission was estopped to deny
license on ground that applicant's premises were within 600 feet of school
when commission had given applicant letter stating that the commission has
"reviewed the survey you submitted . . . [and] the location of the proposed
liquor store in your proposed private club facility satisfies the 600 foot
requirement); Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1987)
(holding state retirement board estopped from reducing benefit of retired state
employee based on years of service that included prior years of service with
county service, or requiring employee to purchase service credit for the county
years, when before employee had retired, board had given employee a letter
stating, "This letter is in regard to your years of service with Salt Lake
County . . . . You do not need to purchase your service with Salt Lake County
from January 1,1955 to February 15,1961. This service has already been
posted to your account

A copy of your statement [which included credit

for the county years] is enclosed for your convenience.").
Second, even assuming that the Tuttles could show a specific written
representation, their allegations fail to show that their reliance on the alleged
representations was reasonable. Again, as the trial court noted, landowners
are presumed to know the extent of their water rights. Dugan v. Jones, 615
P.2d at 1246. Moreover, in Utah, water rights are evidenced by certificates of
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beneficial use issued by the Division of Water Rights after extensive
administrative proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (West 2004); Lake
Shore Duck Club, 166 P. at 311 (noting that certificate of beneficial use
provides "evidence of title, good, at least against the state, for all it purports to
be, and good as against every one else who cannot show a superior right").
Those proceedings provide "the exclusive manner" in which water rights may
be appropriated. See Mosby Irrig. Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 46, 354 P.2d
848, 852 (1960) (citing Title 73, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code). The Tuttles
could not reasonably mistake the groundwater survey for such proceedings or
rely on the groundwater survey as proof that they possessed water rights not
evidenced by certificates of beneficial use. Furthermore, the Tuttles' alleged
reliance on the groundwater survey became all the more treasonable after
they received the 1998 Monroe letter advising them that the Division had no
record of a water right for the Diesel Well. R.27.
Third, the Tuttles' allegations could not support a determination that
manifest injustice would result if estoppel were not applied—quite the
contrary. The Tuttles sold their farms at an inflated price allegedly because
they believed it was worth more than it actually was. They have been required
by the federal judgment to disgorge the excess. Aside from whether the
Tuttles dealt with the buyers in good faith, to allow them to now profit from
the circumstances by recovering that excess from the defendants would itself
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be manifestly unjust. The Tuttles have lost nothing that ever belonged to
them to begin with. They have failed to allege any reason that they should be
allowed to keep property rights that they quickly became aware, long before
the federal judgment was entered, were not theirs.
Contrasting the facts here to those cases in which estoppel has been
applied against the government is instructive. For example, in Eldredge, the
court held that the state retirement board was estopped from removing from a
former employee's retirement account credit for his years of service with the
county. Before the employee had retired, the board had made specific written
representations to him that those years would be included and in reliance on
those representations, the employee had resigned a $ 37,000 a year position
that he could not regain and the employee was financially unable to either
take a reduction in benefits or purchase the years of service. 795 P.2d at 676.
Finally, the Tuttles' allegations could not supports finding that the
exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired by the application of
estoppel. Water in Utah is the property of the public. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-1-1 (West 2004). The Legislature has declared that "beneficial use shall
be the basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this
state." Id. at § 73-1-3. In conducting the groundwater survey, the state
engineer was acting in a governmental, rather than proprietary, capacity. The
groundwater survey was intended to address a serious problem of overuse of
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water in the Pahvant Valley, including the illegal irrigation of an estimated
8,800 acres of land. R.20. To effectively address this problem, the engineer
needed the cooperation of the landowners not only to eliminate irrigation
without water rights, but also to implement water metering and enforcement
of priority rights through a commissioner-based distribution system, if those
steps were also necessary. R.21, 22 & 26. To impose liability on the state
engineer for his assurances that the first phase of the groundwater
management plan—the elimination of irrigation of acreage without water
rights—had been completed would unduly hamper the engineer's ability to
address other similar serious problems.
In sum, the district court correctly dismissed the Tuttles' estoppel claim.
The Tuttles' allegations could not support a determination that defendants
made specific written representations that the Tuttles' water rights were
sufficient to irrigate their farms, that the Tuttles reasonably relied upon the
representations, that manifest injustice would result if estoppel were not
applied, or that the exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired if
estoppel were applied. Accordingly, the judgment below should be affirmed.

5. The Tuttles' Allegations Do Not Support a Takings Claim
The district court also correctly dismissed the Tuttles takings claim, which
like their other claims, relies on the fiction that the groundwater survey
-34-

constituted a determination of their water rights. Again, the Tuttles err.13
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." A
takings claim under article I, section 22 has two elements: "First, the claimant
must demonstrate some protectable interest in property. If the claimant
possesses a protectable property interest, the claimant must then show that
the interest has been taken or damaged by government action." View Condo.
Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2005 UT 91, f 30,127 P.3d 697, 704-05
(alterations and quotation omitted). A "taking" is "any substantial
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its
value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any
substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Id.u
Although water rights constitute protectable property interests, see Sigurd
Cityi>:15tate9^L05 Utah37S,^42P.2d 154,157il943Vthe^Tuttles fail to allege
13

Contrary to the Tuttles' assumption, the district court did not state
that it was dismissing the takings claim because of their failure timely to file
a notice of claim. Rather, the district court did not explain its reasons for
dismissing the takings claim. R. 194-96; Addendum A.
14

In the proceedings below, the Tuttles also cited the takings clause
contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, they did not contend that the Fifth Amendment provides more
protection than article I, section 22. Therefore, defendants do not separately
analyze the Fifth Amendment claim. See View Condo. Owners Ass'n, 2005 UT
91, at f 29 n.5,127 P.3d at 704 n.5 (analyzing takings claim solely under
article I, section 22 when parties did not delineate whether Utah
Constitution provides more protection against a taking than United States
Constitution).
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sufficient facts from which a court could conclude that the defendants ever
made a legal determination that the Tuttles either had, or did not have,
sufficient water rights to irrigate all of their land. As discussed at Point 3
above, the state engineer never made any "determination" of the Tuttles'
water rights. His stated opinions based on the groundwater survey that all
irrigated land in the Pahvant Valley was covered by a valid water right had
no effect on the Tuttles', or anyone else's, certificates of beneficial use, which
were the prima facie evidence of their water rights. It was simply a statement
of his opinion at that time.
Similarly, Terry Monroe's letter to the Ellsworths analyzing the water
rights they purchased from the Tuttles, had no impact on the extent of water
rights that the Tuttles transferred to the Ellsworths. Again, the water rights
appurtenant to the farms were evidenced by the certificates and other official
documents (such as change applications) themselves. Nothing the defendants
did either before or after the Tuttles' sale of their farms to the Ellsworths
altered the Tuttles' certificated water rights.
The Tuttles never owned water rights sufficient to irrigate all of their farm
acreage and neither the state engineer's letter nor Monroe's letter had any
effect on the Tuttles' water rights, whatever they were. Therefore, the Tuttles
did not sustain a taking and the trial court properly dismissed that claim.
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CONCLUSION
The Tuttles' entire complaint is built on a legal fiction: that the state
engineer's stated opinion in March 1996 that all irrigated land in the Pahvant
Valley was covered by valid water rights constituted a legal determination of
the Tuttles' water rights. The trial court correctly rejected that fiction in
dismissing the Tuttles' negligence, estoppel, and taking claims. The
defendants owed the Tuttles no duty to use reasonable care in conducting the
groundwater survey on which the engineer based his opinion. The Tuttles'
allegations fail to establish that defendants ever made a specific written
statement to them that their water rights were sufficient to irrigate their
entire farm acreage, that the Tuttles reasonably relied on the statements that
were made, that failure to apply estoppel against defendants would result in
manifest injustice, or that the application of estoppel would not interfere with
the exercise of a governmental function. The district court also correctly
dismissed the Tuttles' taking claim because the Tuttles had no protectable
property interest in water rights sufficient to irrigate their entire farms.
Accordingly, the judgment below should be affirmed in its entirety.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 14th day of August, 2006.

Debra J. Mowe
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellees
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Telephone: (801) 366-0100

MAR 2 1 2006
SALTLAKEjSbUNTY
Deputy CtartT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W.
TUTTLE J. KENTON TUTTLE and LORI
M. TUTTLE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
:
: CaseNo.050913117

JERRY D. OLDS, Utah State Engineer,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, and TERRY MONROE
Defendants.

: Judge John Paul Kennedy
:
:

Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings came before the Court on February
27,2006, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding, for decision. Having reviewed the
pleadings, Motion, memoranda and materials submitted by the parties, and for good cause
appearing the Court makes the following ruling.
The Courtfindsthat Defendants had no duty to conduct an error-free survey of

ton

groundwater resources in the Pahvant Valley which mcluded property Plaintiffs owned when a
survey was conducted in the early 1990fs. Property owners are presumed to know the amount of
water available to their land, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1246 (Utah 1980), and may only
alter certificated water rights through statutory procedures, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 et seq.
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs failed to file a notice of claim as required by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act within one year of when their claims arose. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-30d-401.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this

dav of /TlfoW^

. 2006.
BY THE COURT

Approved as to Form

^zz
Jack C. Helgesen
Keith M. Backman
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 70

day of March, 2006,1 caused to be served by U.S. mail,

postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Granting Defendants' Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, to the following:
Jack C. Helgesen
Keith M. Backman
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P.C.
Centennial Bank Building
4605 Harrison Blvd, Third Floor
OgdenUt 84403
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C
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*a Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
-•RULE 10. FORM OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and
other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name
of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading
or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge (and commissioner if
applicable) to whom the case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the
action shall include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers
need only state the name of the first party on each side with an indication that
there are other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by
any name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in the
subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with the
court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of any
attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information shall appear
in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall state the name
and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information shall appear in
the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. The plaintiff shall
file together with the complaint a completed cover sheet substantially similar in
form and content to the cover sheet approved by the Judicial Council.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be
made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall b e limited as far
as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph
may b e referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon
a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear
presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption b y reference; exhibits. Statements in
a pleading may be adopted
reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading, or
any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.

by
in

(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other papers filed
with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be typewritten,
printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed p a p e r of letter size
(8 1/2" x 1 1 " ) , with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any typed
material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-hand margin of not
less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half inch. All
typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be double-spaced, except for
® 2006 Thomson/West. N o Claim to Orig. U . S . Govt. W o r k s .
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 10
matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and shall not be smaller
12-point size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all
and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink.

signature

than

lines,

(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the court
shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they are
not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but
may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers
for
nonconforming
papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this rule for
parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party
of any requirement of this rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in
any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without
notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original.
[Amended effective January
2 0 0 0 ; November 1, 2002.]

1,

1983;

April

1,

1990;

April

1,

1998;

November

1,

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
A s a general matter, Rule 10 deals with the form of papers filed with the
court--both "pleadings" as defined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with the
court,"
including
motions,
memoranda,
discovery
responses,
and
orders.
The
changes in the present rule were promulgated to clarify ambiguities in the prior
rule and to address specific problems encountered by the courts. Paragraphs (b) ,
(c) and
(e) of
the rule were not
changed,
except
that
paragraph
(e) was
redesignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (f) were added.
Paragraph (a) . This paragraph specifies requirements for captions in every paper
filed with the court. In addition to the other requirements, the caption must
contain the name of the judge to whom the case is assigned, if the judge's name is
known at the time the paper is filed. In the top left-hand corner of the first
page,
each paper must
state
identifying
information
concerning
the
attorney
representing the party filing the paper. Finally, every pleading must state the
name and current address of the party for whom it is filed; this information
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of the last page. This information
need not be set forth in papers other than pleadings.
Paragraph (d) . The changes in this paragraph make it clear that papers filed with
the court must be
"typewritten, printed or photocopied
in black
type." The
Advisory Committee considered suggestions from different groups that
so-called
"dot matrix" printing be specifically allowed or specifically prohibited.
The
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the requirements that "typing or printing
shall be clearly legible ... and shall not be smaller than pica size." If typing
or printing on papers filed with the court complies with these standards, the
papers should not be deemed to violate the rule merely because they were prepared
in a dot matrix printer. A s currently written, this paragraph also removes any
confusion concerning the top margin and left margin requirements (now 2 inches and
® 2006 Thomson/West. N o Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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1 inch respectively), and this paragraph
bottom margins (both one-half inch).

imposes new

requirements

for right

Paragraph (e) . This paragraph, which is an addition to the rule, requires
signature lines and signatures in permanent black or blue ink.

and

typed

Paragraph (f) . The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk must
accept all papers for filing, even though they may violate the rule, but the clerk
may require counsel to substitute conforming for nonconforming papers. The clerk
is given discretion to waive requirements of the rule for parties who are not
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, the court may relieve parties of
the obligation to comply with the rule or any part of it.
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c
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*! Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
-•RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served
with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty
days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the
answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by
the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the
time for responding to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice
of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7)
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or
objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party
may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d)
Preliminary
hearings.
The
defenses
specifically
enumerated
(l)-(7)
in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join
with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes
a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections
then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted,
except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver
of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which
may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court
of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file
a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such
costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be
required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.]

Westlaw
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This document has been updated.

Use KEYCITE.

West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*! Title V. General Provisions
-•RULE 24. BRIEFS
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a) (1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the
case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a) (2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(a) (3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the
pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(a) (6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and
the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed,
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument
is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately,
the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy
of:
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth
in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule.
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.

No further

(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as
"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer,"
etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to
Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts
shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by
the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred
to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber.
References
to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence
the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or
rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals.
If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court
otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length.
The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments
involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this paragraph
are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause
for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the
brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by
© 2006 Thomson/West. N o Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a
copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any
responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft
brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the
clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and
shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court,
and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006.]
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U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-1

WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 2. STATE ENGINEER--DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS
§ 73-2-1. State engineer--Term--Powers and duties--Qualification for duties
(1) There shall b e a state engineer.
(2) The state engineer shall:
(a) be appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate;
(b) hold
and

office

for

the

term of

four years

and until

a successor

is appointed;

(c) have five years experience as a practical
engineer or the
knowledge, practical experience, and skill necessary for the position.
(3) (a) The state engineer shall be responsible for the general
supervision
of the waters
of the state
and the measurement,
apportionment, and distribution of those waters.

theoretical

administrative
appropriation,

(b) The state engineer shall have the power t o :
(i) make and publish rules necessary to carry out the duties of his office;
(ii) secure the equitable apportionment and distribution
to the respective rights of appropriators; and

of the water

according

(iii) bring suit in courts of competent jurisdiction to:
(A) enjoin the unlawful
underground water;

appropriation,

diversion,

and

use

of

surface

and

(B) prevent waste, loss, or pollution of those waters; and
(C) enable him to carry out the duties of his office.
(c) The state engineer shall:
(i) upon request from the board of trustees of an irrigation district under
Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 7, Irrigation Districts, or a local district under
Title 17B, Chapter 2, Local Districts, that operates an irrigation
water
system, cause a water survey to be made of all lands proposed to be annexed to
the district in order to determine and allot the maximum amount of water that
could be beneficially used on the land, with a separate survey and allotment
being made for each 4 0-acre or smaller tract in separate ownership; and
® 2006 Thomson/West. N o Claim to Orig. U . S . Govt. Works.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-1

(ii) upon completion of the survey and allotment under Subsection (3)(c) (i) ,
file with the district board a return of the survey and report of the allotment.
(4) (a) The
boundaries.

state

engineer

may

establish

water

districts

and

define

their

(b) The water districts shall be formed in a manner that:
(i) secures the best protection to the water claimants; and
(ii) is the most economical for the state to supervise.
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 7; Laws 1921, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1941, c. 96, § 1; Laws 1991,
c. 3, § 1; Laws 2001, c. 90, § 61, eff. April 30, 2001.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-2-1; C. 1943, § 100-2-1.
CROSS REFERENCES
Natural Resources Act, see § 63-34-1 et seq.
Rulemaking, Administrative Rulemaking Act, see § 63-46a-1 et seq.
Water resource board, see § 72-10-1.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Davis, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:
Control, 8 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).

Utah's

Engel, Water Quality Control: The Reality
Management, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 491 (1992).

of

Liability

Priority

in

Immunity

Utah

for

Flood

Groundwater

Freemyer and Bunnell, Legal Impediments to Interstate Water Marketing: Application
to Utah, 9 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 237 (1989).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Waters and Water Courses C=>133.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 405kl33.
C.J.S. Waters §§ 333 to 337, 357, 359 to 360, 362 to 364, 367, 391, 435.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Water rights,
Extent of water rights, see State of Arizona v. State of California, 1936,
56 S.Ct. 848, 298 U.S. 558, 80 L.Ed. 1331, rehearing denied 57 S.Ct. 4, 299
U.S. 618, 81 L.Ed. 456.
Vested rights of first to appropriate, see State of Ariz. v. State of Cal.,
U.S.Ariz.1963, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 373 U.S. 546, 10 L.Ed.2d 542, entered 84 S.Ct.
® 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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UT ST § 73-2-1
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-1
755, 376 U.S. 340, 11 L.Ed.2d 757, amended 86 S.Ct. 924, 383 U.S. 268, 15
L.Ed.2d 743, amended 104 S.Ct. 1900, 466 U.S. 144, 80 L.Ed.2d 194.
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 2. STATE ENGINEER--DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS
§ 73-2-15. Agreements with federal and state agencies--Investigations, surveys
or adjudications
The state engineer, for and on behalf of the state of Utah, with the approval of
the executive director of natural resources and the governor, is authorized to
enter into agreements with any federal or state agency, subdivision or institution
for cooperation in making snow surveys and investigations of both underground and
surface water resources of the state. The state engineer is further authorized to
cooperate with such agencies, subdivisions and institutions, with the approval of
the executive director and the governor, for the investigation of flood and
erosion control and for the adjudication of water rights. The expenses of such
investigations, surveys and adjudications shall be divided between the cooperating
parties upon an equitable basis.
Laws 1937, c. 130, § 2; Laws 1941, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 40, § 1; Laws 1967, c. 176,
§ 12; Laws 1969, C. 198, § 7.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-2-15; C. 1943, § 100-2-15.
CROSS REFERENCES
Federal assistance management program, purposes, see § 63-4 0-1.
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-15, UT ST § 73-2-15

Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess.

® 2004 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 2. STATE ENGINEER--DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS
§ 73-2-17. Authorization of cooperative investigations of groundwater resources
The state engineer, for and on behalf of the state of Utah, with the approval of
the executive director and the governor, is authorized and directed to enter into
an agreement with the United States geological survey or any other federal or
state agency, for cooperation in making investigations of the groundwater
resources of the state and reporting thereon.
Laws 1935, c. 106, § 1; Laws 1941, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 41, § 1; Laws 1967, c. 176,
§ 13; Laws 1969, c. 198, § 8.
Codifications C. 1943, § 100-2-17.
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-2-17, UT ST § 73-2-17

Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess.

® 2004 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT

2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 3. APPROPRIATION
§ 73-3-17. Certificate of appropriation--Evidence
Upon it being made to appear to the satisfaction of the state engineer that an
appropriation or a permanent change of point of diversion, place or nature of use
has been perfected in accordance with the application therefor, and that the water
appropriated or affected by the change has been put to a beneficial use, as
required by Section 73-3-16, he shall issue a certificate, in duplicate, setting
forth the name and post-office address of the person by whom the water is used,
the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in second-feet appropriated, the
purpose for which the water is used, the time during which the water is to be used
each year, the name of the stream or source of supply from which the water is
diverted, the date of the appropriation or change, and such other matter as will
fully and completely define the extent and conditions of actual application of the
water to a beneficial use; provided that certificates issued on applications for
projects constructed pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
and for the federal projects constructed by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, referred to in Section 73-3-16 of said Code, need show no more than
the facts shown in the proof. The certificate shall not extend the rights
described in the application. Failure to file proof of appropriation or proof of
change of the water on or before the date set therefor shall cause the application
to lapse. One copy of such certificate shall be filed in the office of the state
engineer and the other shall be delivered to the appropriator or to the person
making the change who shall, within thirty days, cause the same to be recorded in
the office of the county recorder of the county in which the water is diverted
from the natural stream or source. The certificate so issued and filed shall be
prima facie evidence of the owner1 s right to the use of the water in the quantity,
for the purpose, at the place, and during the time specified therein, subject to
prior rights.
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 56; Laws 1937, c. 130, § 1; Laws 1953, c.
1955, c. 160, § 1.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-3-17; C. 1943, § 100-3-17.

130, § 1; Laws
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 5. ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION
§ 73-5-9. Powers of state engineer as to waste, pollution or contamination of
waters
To prevent waste, loss, pollution or contamination of any waters whether above or
below the ground, the state engineer may require the repair or construction of
head gates or other devices on ditches or canals, and the repair or installation
of caps, valves or casings on any well or tunnel or the plugging or filling
thereof to accomplish the purposes of this section.
Any requirement made by the state engineer in accordance with this section shall
be executed by and at the cost and expense of the owner, lessee or person having
control of such diverting works affected. If within ten days after notice of such
requirement as provided in this section, the owner, lessee or person having
control of the water affected, has not commenced to carry out such requirement, or
if he has commenced to comply therewith but shall not thereafter proceed
diligently to complete the work, the state engineer may forbid the use of water
from such source until the user thereof shall comply with such requirement.
Failure to comply with any requirement made by the state engineer in accordance
with the provisions of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor. Each day that
such violation is permitted to continue shall constitute a separate offense.
Laws 1935, c. 105, § 2.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-5-11; C. 1943, § 100-5-11.
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 4. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
§ 73-4-1. By engineer on petition
Environmental Quality

of

users--Upon

request

of Department

of

(1) Upon a verified petition to the state engineer, signed by five or more or a
majority of water users upon any stream or water source, requesting the
investigation of the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters of
such stream or water source, it shall be the duty of the state engineer, if upon
such investigation he finds the facts and conditions are such as to justify a
determination of said rights, to file in the district court an action to determine
the various rights. In any suit involving water rights the court may order an
investigation and survey by the state engineer of all the water rights on the
source or system involved.
(2)(a) As used in this section, "executive director" means the executive director
of the Department of Environmental Quality.
(b) The executive director, with the concurrence of the governor, may request
that the state engineer file in the district court an action to determine the
various water rights in the stream, water source, or basin for an area within the
exterior boundaries of the state for which any person or organization or the
federal government is actively pursuing or processing a license application for a
storage facility or transfer facility for high-level nuclear waste or greater
than class C radioactive waste.
(c) Upon receipt of a request made under Subsection
shall file the action in the district court.

(2) (b) , the state engineer

(d) If a general adjudication has been filed in the state district court
regarding the area requested pursuant to Subsection (2) (b) , the state engineer
and the state attorney general shall join the United States as a party to the
action.
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 20; Laws 2001, c. 107, § 16, eff. March 15, 2001.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-4-1; C. 1943, § 100-4-1.

Addendum C

FILED IN UNITED!
COURT. DISTRIC

DISTRICT
UTAH

302003
B. ZIMMER, CLERK
DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DIS'

OF UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

GRANT ELLSWORTH ana r c n N
ELLSWORTH,
Plaintiffs,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
(J. KENTON AND LORIM. TUTTLE)

vs.

WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W.
TUTTLE, J. KENTON TUTTLE, and
LORIE M. TUTTLE,

Case No. 2:01CV907K

Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions according to the burdens ofproof as I have
instructed. For those questions which require a clear and convincing burden ofproof, if you find
the evidence in favor of the question presented is clear and convincing, answer it "yes." If you
find the evidence in favor of the question is not clear and convincing, answer it "no."
For those questions which require only a preponderance of the evidence, if you find the
evidence preponderates in favor of die question presented, answer it "yes." If you find that the
evidence preponderates against the question presented, answer it "no." If on any question you
find that the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine an answer, then answer
the question "no."
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We, the Jury, answer the question submitted as follows:
QUESTIONS REGARDING FRAUD
Question No. 1
Do you find that Kenton Turtle was acting as an agent for Lori Tuttle for purposes of
selling their farm?
Yes

S

No

Proceed to Question No. 2.
Question No. 2
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant

Kenton Tuttle committed fraud?
Yes

*S

No

If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "yes," then go on to Question Nos. 2(b) and
2(c)* If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "no," then skip Question Nos. 2(b) and 2(c),
and proceed to Question No. 3.
(b)

State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result

of this fraud.
Damages: $
(c)

V/^ffO.OO

State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be

awarded as a result of this fraud by checking the box next to A andfillingin the amount If you
find that punitive damagg&^fe-nOt appropriate, check the box next to B.
(A) /OfwCcc punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:

$ /r^DOo
(B)

.

punitive damages should not be awarded.

2
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Question No. 3
If your answer to Question No. 1 k "ytt," then skip Question No. 3 and proceed to
Question No. 4. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no." then answer Question No. 3.
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Lori

Tuttle committed fraud?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "ves." then go on to Question Nos. 3(b) and
3(c). If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "no," then skip Question Nos. 3(b) and 3(c),
and proceed to Question No. 4.
(b)

State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result

of this fraud
Damages: $
(c)

State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be

awarded as a result of thisfraudby checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If you
find that punitive damages^re^iot appropriate, check the box next to B,
(A)

punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:
$

(B)

.

punitive damages should not be awarded.

QUESTIONS REGARDING MISTAKE
If youfindliability forfraudand awarded damages for the involved property, then skip
Question No. 4. If you did notfindliability and award damages for the involved property, then
answer Question No. 4.

3
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Question No. 4
Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence their claim for
(a) mutual mistake?

Yes

(b) unilateral mistake?

Yes

(c) material misrepresentation?

Yes

No,
_

No.

or
J*

No

Stop here. Have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict Form on the
last page and return it to the Court
DATED this

^0

day of Arpi^l I

4

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

CLERK

_MABKUS

BY.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRI

WfflBk

CENTRAL DIVISION

GRANT ELLSWORTH and FERN
ELLSWORTH,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

WILLIAM J. TUTTLE, CHARLENE W.
TUTTLE, J. KENTON TUTTLE, and
LORIM. TUTTLE,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
(WILLIAM J. AND CHARLENE W.
TUTTLE)

Case No. 2:01CV907K

Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions according to the burdens of proof as I have
instructed. For those questions which require a clear and convincing burden of proof, if you find
the evidence in favor of the question presented is clear and convincing, answer it "yes." If you
find the evidence in favor of the question is not clear and convincing, answer it "no."
For those questions which require only a preponderance of the evidence, if you find the
evidence preponderates in favor of die question presented, answer it "yes." If you find that the
evidence preponderates against the question presented, answer it "no." If on any question you
find that the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot detennine an answer, then answer
the question "no."

2206

I'lSTT

Wc, the Jury, answer the question submitted as follows:
QUESTIONS REGARDING FRAUD
Question No, 1
Do you find that Bill Tuttle was acting as an agent for Charlene Tuttle for purposes of
selling their farm?
Yes

s
v

No

Proceed to Question No. 2.
Question No. 2
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Bill

Tuttle committed fraud?
Yes _>S_

No

If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "yes." then go on to Question Nos. 2(b) and
2(c). If your answer to Question No. 2(a) is "no." then skip Question Nos, 2(b) and 2(c),
and proceed to Question No. 3.
(b)

State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result

of this fraud.
Damage: S ^ O ^ ^ i O
(c)

State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be

awarded as a result of thisfraudby checking the box next to A andfillingin the amount. If you
find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check the box next to B.
(A)

\

punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:

$ I^Ot OCT? •
(B)

punitive damages should not be awarded

2207

Question No. 3
If your answer to Question No* 1 is "yes*" then skip Question No, 3 and proceed to
Question No. 4. If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no," then answer Question No. 3.
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant

Charlene Turtle committed fraud?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "yes," then go on to Question Nos. 3(b) and
3(c). If your answer to Question No. 3(a) is "no," then skip Question Nos. 3(b) and 3(c),
and proceed to Question No. 4.
(b)

State the amount of compensatory damages that the Ellsworths incurred as a result

of this fraud
Damages: $
(c)

State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be

awarded as a result of thisfraudby checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If you
find that punitive damages are not appropriate, checlrthe box^nexttoB.
(A)

punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:
$

(B)

.

punitive damages should not be awarded.

QUESTIONS REGARDING MISTAKE
If youfindliability forfraudand awarded damages for the involved property, then skip
Question No. 4. If you did notfindliability and award damages for the involved property, then
answer Question No. 4.

3
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Question No. 4
Have the Ellsworths proven by clear and convincing evidence of their claim for:
(a) mutual mistake?

Yes

No

«<^^:;norr

(b) unilateral mistake?

Yes

No

;or

(c) material misrepresentation?

Yes

No

.

Proceed to Question No. 5.
QUESTIONS REGARDING BREACH OF WARRANTY
Question No. 5
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence a breach of

warranty under the Bill/Charlene Tuttle Real Estate Purchase Contract with respect to whether
the Diesel Well was properly permitted and fit for its intended purpose?
Yes

v

No

If you answer "yes" to Question No. 5(a), proceed to Question No. 5(b). If you
answer "no" to Question No. 5(a), skip Question No. 5(b) and proceed to Question No. 6.
(b)

State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential

damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of breach of warranty.
Damages: $

iZ^OOT^

Proceed to Question No. 6.
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE JUNE 29,1999 WRITING
Question No. 6
Do youfindthat the June 29,1999 writing is an entirely new agreement, rather than a
modification of the Bill/Charlene Real Estate Purchase Contract?
Yes \S

No

Proceed to Question No, 7.
4

2209

Question No. 7
Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of die evidence that the June 29,1999
writing, whether a new agreement or a modification, is not a valid contract because it lacks
consideration?
Yes

\'

No

If yon answered "yes" to Question No. 7, skip Question Nos. 8 and % and proceed to
Question No. 10. If you answered "no" to Question No. 7, proceed to Question No. 8.
Question No. 8
Have the Ellsworths proven that the June 29,1999 writing, whether a new agreement or a
modification, is not a valid contract because the parties did not have a meeting of the minds
regarding one of its integral terms?
Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 8, skip Question No. 9, and proceed to
Question No. 10. If you answered "no" to Question No. 8, proceed to Question No. 9.
OnestioirNo^
Do you find that the parties intended for the term "proceeds" to mean that the additional
7% interest would only become due if the 1999 hay crop generated a net profit (income exceeded
expenses)?

Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 9, proceed to Question No. 10. If yon
answered "no" to Question No. 9, proceed to Question No. 13.

5
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Question No. 10
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bill or

Charlene Tuttle, acting as an agent for the other, wrongfully converted funds from die 1999 farm
operating account?
Yes_\/_

No

If you answered Myesff to Question No. 10(a), then proceed to Question Nos. 10(b)
and (e). If you answered "no" to Question No. 10(a), then skip Question Nos. 10(b) and (c),
and proceed to Question Nos. 11 and 12.
(b)

State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential

damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this wrongful conversion.
Damages: SmBqfa
(c)

II,OOD

State the amount of punitive damages that the Ellsworths should be awarded as a

result of this wrongful conversion by checking the box next to A and filling in the amount If
you find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check the box next to B.
(A)

•

punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:
$

(B) \s^

.

punitive damages should not be awarded.
OuestionNo.il

(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bill Tuttle

wrongfully converted funds from the 1999 farm operating account?
Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 11(a), then proceed to Question Nos. 11(b)
and (c). If you answered "no" to Question No. 11(a), then skip Question Nos. 11(b) and (c)t
and proceed to Question No. 12.
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(b)

State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential

damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this wrongful conversion.
Damages: $
(c)

State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be

awarded as a result of this wrongfiil conversion by checking the box next to A andfillingin the
amount If you find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check die box next to B.
(A)

punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:
$

(B)

.

punitive damages should not be awarded.
Question No. \l

(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Charlene

Turtle wrongfully converted fundsfromthe 1999 farm operating account?
Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 12(a), then proceed to Question Nos. 12(b)
and (c). If you answered "noH to Question No. 12(a), then skip Question Nos. 12(b) and (c),
and proceed to Question No. 13.
(b)

State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential

damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this wrongful conversion.
Damages: $
(c)

State the amount of punitive damages, if any, that the Ellsworths should be

awarded as a result of this wrongful conversion by checking the box next to A andfillingin the
amount. If you find that punitive damages are not appropriate, check the box next to B.
(A)

punitive damages should be awarded in the following amount:
$

,
7

2212

(B)

punitive damages should not be awarded.
Question No, 13

(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Bill/Charlene Tuttle Real Estate Purchase Contract was breached by the removal of funds from
the 1999 farm operating acc^nftt for payment of the additional 7% interest?
Yes

y

No

If you answered "yes" to Question No. 13(a), then proceed to Question No. 13(b). If
you answered "no" to Question No. 13(a), then skip Question No. 13(b), and proceed to
Question No. 14.
(b)

State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential

damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of breach of the real estate purchase contracts by
removal of fundsfromthe 1999 farm operating account for payment of the additional 7%
interest
Damages: $

I^ZcX?

Proceed to Question Nort4r~
QUESTIONS REGARDING BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR REMOVAL OF FUNDS
FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON LOANS THAT PREDATED 1999
Question No. 14
(a)

Have the Ellsworths proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Bill/Charlene Tuttle Real Estate Purchase Contract was breached by the removal of funds from
the 1999 farm operating account for payment of interest on loans that were incurred prior to
1999?

S
Yes

V

No

8
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If you answered My^ff to Question No. 14(a), then proceed to Question No. 14(b). If
you answered "no" to Question No* 14(a), stop here. Have the jury foreperson sign and
date this Special Verdict Form on the last page and return it to the Court
(b)

State the amount of damages, including both compensatory and consequential

damages, that the Ellsworths incurred as a result of this breach of contract by removing funds
from the 1999 farm operating account for payment of interest on loans that were incurred by the
Defendants) prior to 1999.
Damages: $

fpOU

Stop here. Have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict Form on the
last page and returni it
It to the Court
DATED this ^ 1 /

^~il

day of ~.WmY)

. 2(

9
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